Naomi Zack's new book offers a kind of Humpty-Dumpty version of the recent career of feminist theory. The story begins about twenty years ago, when the feminist movement fell into conceptual and political disarray. Feminist theory imploded in response to charges that although it purported to be about all women it was in fact narrowly focused on white, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied women of the Western world. Feminism came to acknowledge the kinds of differences race, class, culture, and other variables make to women's identities and lives, but did so in such a way as to undermine the possibility of a unified women's movement. As Zack argues, Intersectionality is believed to be democratic because women of color now have the authority, demanded by them and sanctioned by white feminists, to create their own feminisms. But, as a theory of women's identity, intersectionality is not inclusive insofar as members of specific intersections of race and class can create only their own feminisms. (2) And so, instead of a unified women's movement grounded in a theory of women's commonality, we ended up with the shards and splats of narrowly focused identity-based feminisms.
Intersectionality is believed to be democratic because women of color now have the authority, demanded by them and sanctioned by white feminists, to create their own feminisms. But, as a theory of women's identity, intersectionality is not inclusive insofar as members of specific intersections of race and class can create only their own feminisms. (2) And so, instead of a unified women's movement grounded in a theory of women's commonality, we ended up with the shards and splats of narrowly focused identity-based feminisms.
The good news, according to Zack, is that it is possible for feminists not simply to put Humpty back together again (why do that, if Humpty was myopically constructed to begin with?) but to craft a new and much better version. Indeed, with the right ingredients, Zack urges, feminists can build a movement that could create a world in which "the governments of all the major countries in the world will be controlled by women," their rule having as its "two universal objectives . . . the end of violence and the preservation of natural environments" (164).
Hypatia
The heart of Zack's book is her account of such ingredients. They include an adequate conception of the category 'women,' an understanding of the nature of gender and its development in the context of different cultures and populations, and psychological and social theories that acknowledge the reach and force of oppression while pointing to agency in subjects and possibilities for change in the societies in which they live.
As Zack sees it, joint political activity among women requires an "inclusive foundation" (6), and such a foundation can only be provided by a definition of 'woman' from which no woman can be excluded. Such a definition must point to what women have in common even as it also makes room for crucial differences among us. Intersectionality accounted for differences, but at much too heavy a price: it appeared to deny the possibility that there is anything all women have in common. The solution, Zack thinks, lies in a definition of 'women' that posits that "what women have in common is a relation and not a thing" (2). She spells this claim out in the following way:
Women are those human beings who are related to the historical category of individuals who are designated female from birth or biological mothers or primary sexual choice of men. Call this category FMP. The relation of women to the disjunctive FMP category is that of being assigned to the whole category or identifying with the whole category. The relation of assignment to, or identification with, the FMP category is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a woman, and there is every reason to view it as an essence shared by all women. (8) What makes an individual count as a woman is not some substantive property but rather a relation to (assignment to or identification with) a category of individuals designated in a particular way. The point of articulating the grounds for commonality among women is not simply to prevent unwanted exclusion of the sort characteristic of second-wave feminism; it also serves as "a moral basis to end oppression by making liberatory efforts compelling to all women in their sameness. . . . Because they are all women, in this relation to the historical group of women, affluent American feminists should support women struggling against physical violence or famine in other parts of the world," on the grounds that samely situated individuals are morally entitled to the same treatment (9).
Zack points out that "a universal definition of women does not automatically mean that women are a social class" (125). However, she says, it does mean that women don't have to search around for "an identity on which they can unite because they already have it" (134). The task of feminists is to make women vividly aware of this fact. Men's rule of the world has been characterized by "aggression, violence, exploitation, and destruction" (124). Women are well poised to call men to account for such rule, and to lead in ways that serve "the good of all human beings and the preservation of the planetary life world" (124)-not because of any particular "nurturing essence" but because they haven't been raised to be men and they now constitute greater than half of the voting public around the world (125).
In Inclusive Feminism, Zack seems to be driven by a strong sense of urgency not only about the state of feminist theory but also about the state of a world ruled for so long by men. Indeed, as she sees it, the very sustainability of human and other forms of life seems to depend on the possibility of a worldwide feminist movement, which itself depends on women understanding what they have in common. But surely among the questions readers are likely to have is whether the FMP category of women is either necessary or sufficient for the kind of work Zack hopes it can do.
It's not clear how Zack's FMP definition insures that just because Sojourner Truth, for example, counted as a woman by that definition, other women would have been brought to the conclusion that they shared something morally and politically significant in common with her. After all, white women eager to defend slavery didn't seem to doubt that black female slaves had been designated female at birth, were biological mothers, or were the primary sexual choice of men. Indeed, it seems safe to say that they implicitly acknowledged that they and female slaves fit into such a category. But this acknowledgment hardly kept white women from regularly distinguishing themselves from black women by allegations of or insinuations about their immoral sexual behavior and inferiority as mothers. The fact that one woman cannot recognize another human being as a woman without understanding that they have something in common (even à la family resemblance) does not mean that she will think it significant that the other person is a woman if she does admit the commonality. Zack seems hopeful that differences among women will be less threatening to the possibility of unified theory and action if only we recognize a commonality underlying such differences. But the history of racism and elitism testify to the lengths women and men will go to try to make sure that what people have in common will be far outweighed by their differences. Recognition of commonality, far from being a wake-up call to shared projects, may be a sharp prod to create and accentuate differences.
But if recognition of the kind of commonality Zack describes is not sufficient for a sense of shared situation or shared concerted effort, neither is it necessary. Zack tends to write as if the notion and the fact of solidarity did not exist, as if commonality were never something created, that it always has to be "found," discovered under the conceptual or political bushes. It seems odd for Zack to conclude that recognition of intersectionality entailed the existence of an unlimited number of distinct "feminisms" the members of which had nothing, could have nothing, to say to one another. There is no doubt that plenty of political organizations arose to attend specifically to the needs and goals of groups of women smaller than the class of all women. And for good reason women became cautious about attempting to speak on behalf of other women simply because "we're all women." But that hardly meant that women who identified themselves differently along racial or class lines, for example, gave up the possibility of working together on reproductive rights, sexual harassment, or the welfare system. As Bernice Johnson Reagon famously pointed out, even before the heyday of "intersectionality," the fact that thoughtful coalition work was going to be hard didn't mean we couldn't or shouldn't do it; indeed, she insisted that there is nothing but coalition politics: "There is no hiding place. There is nowhere you can go and only be with people who are like you. It's over. Give it up" (1983, 357) .
The FMP category, in short, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the kind of coalition work Zack seems to have in mind. Indeed, relying on it is likely to foreclose just the kind of difficult discussions and day-to-day negotiations that joint political action requires. "We're all women here"-even if, perhaps especially if, it's understood along the lines Zack urges-is a suspicious rallying cry, in no small part because it seems to substitute metaphysics for politics, to exclude the possibility that the question of what women have in common is itself subject to political negotiation. Despite Zack's helpful insistence toward the end of the book that what is needed "is not some impossible common tongue but a common ear" (141), her confidence in the FMP category tends to come across as a suggestion that there's nothing hard to understand, rather than as an invitation to do the hard work of such understanding.
